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ABSTRACT
Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009) show that a new Keynesian model with a regime-switching monetary
policy rule can support multiple solutions that depend only on the fundamental shocks in the model.
Their note appears to find solutions in regions of the parameter space where there should be no bounded
solutions, according to conditions in Davig and Leeper (2007). This puzzling finding is straightforward
to explain: Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (FWZ) derive solutions using a model that differs from the
one to which the Davig and Leeper (DL) conditions apply. FWZ's multiple solutions rely on special
assumptions about the correlation structure between fundamental shocks and policy regimes, blurring
the distinction between "deep" parameters that govern behavior and the parameters that govern the
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Forward-looking economic agents base decisions not only on monetary policy choices
today, but also on the expected future path of policy choices. Troy Davig and Eric M.
Leeper (2007) examine the implications of this basic feature of rational expectations
in environments in which policy rules, or regimes, undergo recurring changes. When
agents’ expectations functions embed the possibility of policy regime changes in the
future, the nature of rational expectations equilibria can be altered in fundamental
ways.
Spillovers from anticipated future regimes can dramatically change the current
equilibrium. Even if current policy hawkishly reacts to combat incipient inﬂation,
for example, the possibility of moving to a more dovish regime in the future can
raise the volatility of inﬂation today. Because determinacy of equilibrium depends
on policy behavior in the long run, conditions for a determinate equilibrium depend
on current policy, all possible future policies, and the transition probabilities among
policy regimes. Characteristics of the entire policy process—something akin to Davig
and Leeper’s “long-run Taylor principle”—determine whether a model has a unique
equilibrium. This is the idea behind generalizing the Taylor principle.
Roger E. A. Farmer, Daniel Waggoner, and Tao Zha (2009a) show that a new
Keynesian model with a regime-switching monetary policy rule can support multiple
solutions that depend only on the fundamental shocks in the model. Their note
appears to ﬁnd solutions in regions of the parameter space where there should be
no bounded solutions, according to conditions in Davig and Leeper (2007). This
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puzzling ﬁnding is straightforward to explain: Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (FWZ)
and Davig and Leeper (DL) study determinacy of equilibrium in diﬀerent models.
Perhaps more importantly, the FWZ solutions also rest on cross-equation restrictions
between behavioral relations and the exogenous driving process. As a consequence of
this rather special assumption, the processes governing the exogenous variables must
be a particular function of all the parameters of the model—private and policy—
undermining the sharp distinctions among “deep parameters” that are typical in
optimizing models.1 With these conventional distinctions abandoned, it is diﬃcult
to ascribe economic interpretations to FWZ’s additional solutions. We, therefore,
disagree with FWZ’s conclusion that there is “no economic reason to prefer one subset
of fundamental equilibria over another.”
FWZ derive their results using a quasi-linear version of an underlying non-linear
model. DL derive determinacy conditions using a linear representation of the quasi-
linear setup. The linear representation captures many of the interestingnon-linearities
induced by regime switching. DL prove that the minimum state variable (MSV) so-
lution to the linear representation is the unique bounded solution, so long as policy
behavior satisﬁes the long-run Taylor principle. Although that MSV solution also
solves the quasi-linear system, DL make no claims about determinacy of the solution
for the quasi-linear model: non-linearity induced by the regime-switching policy pro-
cess may permit non-MSV solutions to exist. FWZ derive a class of such non-MSV
solutions. Because these solutions apply to the quasi-linear model, FWZ’s claim of
ﬁnding a “counterexample” to DL’s determinacy proposition is inaccurate. DL pro-
vide necessary and suﬃcient conditions for determinacy of a bounded equilibrium of
the linear representation, while FWZ do not provide such conditions for the quasi-
linear system.
To some readers, FWZ’s comment may raise a more fundamental question: does a
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equilibrium even though policy occasionally has periods when it behaves passively?
This question is of more than just theoretical interest. Even inﬂation targeting central
banks have multiple objectives. They care about ﬁnancial stability, output ﬂuctua-
tions, labor market developments, and low and stable inﬂation rates. Recent central
bank actions around the world demonstrate myriad ways in which monetary policy
can deviate from the Taylor principle to address these other concerns. Do such ex-
cursions into passive policy behavior risk leaving inﬂation expectations unanchored
and threaten to destabilize the inﬂation process? If a generalized, or long-run, Taylor
principle exists and monetary policy obeys that generalized principle, then indeter-
minacy of equilibrium is not necessarily created by periods of passive policy behavior.
Nothing in FWZ’s comment diminishes the eﬃcacy or the usefulness of the notion of
a generalized Taylor principle. Naturally, the precise nature of the long-run Taylor
principle depends on the model under consideration and the deﬁnition of determinacy
employed. In any case, the generalized Taylor principle is alive and well.
1. Quasi-Linear vs. Linear Representations
DL lay out a framework that allows researchers to employ existing tools to solve
and analyze purely forward-looking Markov-switching rational expectations models.
The new Keynesian model with linearized private sector relations and a switching
monetary policy rule is the laboratory for our approach. We specify that setup as
xt = Etxt+1 − σ−1(it − Etπt+1) + uD
t ,
πt = βEtπt+1 + κxt + uS
t ,
it = α(st)πt + γ(st)xt.

   
   
(QL)
We will refer to this representation as model “QL,” for quasi-linear. It has an appro-
priate log-linearization of the underlying non-linear model describing private sector
behavior, the ﬁrst two equations, but the monetary policy rule, the third equation,
is non-linear. Equilibria in these models include expectations formation eﬀects thatREPLY TO “GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: A COMMENT” 4
capture how behavior in one regime spills over to aﬀect equilibrium outcomes in other
regimes.
It is straightforward to solve the QL model using the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients. That solution method, however, is silent on whether the solution is
unique. To derive conditions for determinacy of equilibrium, DL rewrite expectations
by distributing probability mass for the two possible regimes, st = 1,2, across the



























where πit = πt(st = i,uD
t ,uS
t ), xit = xt(st = i,uD
t ,uS
t ), for i = 1,2. The information
set, Ω
−s
t = {st−1,...,rt,rt−1,...}, excludes the current regime, so Ωt = Ω
−s
t ∪{st}. An
important maintained assumption in DL is that the fundamental shocks, (uD
t ,uS
t ), are
independent of the regime, st. This approach to specifying conditional expectations
for inﬂation is similar to the approaches in Stephen Gordon and Pascal St-Amour
(2000) and Ravi Bansal and Hao Zhou (2002). These expressions for expectations
strike us as completely natural, particularly since we cannot take a ﬁrst-order ap-
proximation to the policy rule because the reaction coeﬃcients are not diﬀerentiable
in the state variable.
The beneﬁt of writing expectations as in (1)-(2) is that after substituting the ex-
pressions for expectations into (QL), one obtains the following linear representation
AYt = BYt−1 + Aηt + Cut (L)
where Yt contains regime-dependent values for inﬂation and output, ηt are the regime-
dependent one-step-ahead forecast errors, and ut are the fundamental shocks (see
our original paper for additional details). We refer to this representation as model
“L” for linear, since it is a linear system of expectational diﬀerence equations. TheREPLY TO “GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: A COMMENT” 5
coeﬃcient matrices embed the transition probabilities governing regime change and
regime-dependent parameters. Further, we show that the unique bounded solution
to model L corresponds exactly to the solution using the method of undetermined
coeﬃcients on the minimum set of state variables—the MSV solution. Model L is
extremely tractable. It allows one to compute the solution, check for determinacy,
and even estimate regime-switching rational expectations models using traditional
tools designed for ﬁxed-regime models [see, for example, Davig and Taeyoung Doh
(2008)].
Using model L, we show that a passive monetary policy regime need not induce
indeterminacy if agents expect a future shift to a more active policy—the idea of a
generalized Taylor principle. However, the passive regime cannot be “too passive” or
be expected to last “too long,” notions made precise by the long-run Taylor princi-
ple that DL derive. Too much passive policy behavior violates the long-run Taylor
principle and produces multiple equilibria that are subject to sunspot ﬂuctuations.
Importantly, our results regarding determinacy apply to model L, something the
technical results in the paper make clear. FWZ acknowledge we do not make claims
regarding determinacy for model QL and state, “...Davig and Leeper’s generalized
Taylor principle impliesa unique bounded equilibriumof the expanded linear system,”
the model in (L) [FWZ Section V]. FWZ’s multiple (non-MSV) solutions, therefore,
do not constitute a counterexample to our results.
FWZ’s statements are misleading in another dimension also. They refer to model
QL as the original non-linear model. But the ﬁrst two equations of (QL) come from
log-linearizing private sector relations around the deterministic steady state. Non-
linearityarises entirelyby allowing the coeﬃcientsin the policy rule to switch. Clearly,
model QL is not the original non-linear model.2 FWZ provide no argument for why
model QL is intrinsically more interesting than model L. As the examples in DLREPLY TO “GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: A COMMENT” 6
illustrate and our comments below amplify, it is clear that model L captures essential
non-linearities that arise from regime switching. Those non-linearities, together with
model L’s tractability, make it an appealing object with which to work.
2. Discussion of the FWZ Fundamental Equilibria
FWZ’s non-MSV solution is a linear combination of the MSV solution and an
autoregressive term. It takes the form
yt = Gstut + V ωt, (3)
ωt = Λstωt−1 + Mstst−1ut, (4)
where yt = [πt,xt]
0, ut are fundamental shocks and ωt is an autoregressive component
that aﬀects the equilibrium at time t. The solution in (3) consists of two parts: the
MSV solution, Gstut, and the non-MSV part, ωt. Because ωt is a distributed lag of
ut,ut−1,ut−2,..., the autoregressive term embodies the minimum state, ut, that suf-
ﬁces to construct a solution to model QL plus the entire history of the fundamental
shocks, ut−s,s > 0. The volatility of the non-MSV component is not uniquely deter-
mined, since Mst,st−1 can be any 1×2 real matrix. Λst is zero when st corresponds to
the active monetary regime and |Λst| < 1 when st corresponds to the passive regime.
Below, we refer to (3)-(4) as the FWZ solution.
To keep the solution bounded, FWZ require that the autoregressive parameters of
the non-MSV term, Λst, change precisely when regime changes. The serial correlation
properties of the non-MSV component must switch in a manner that is perfectly
synchronized with changes in the monetary policy regime. In an example in section
V of FWZ’s comment, the matrix V in (3) is determined by the eigenvector of the
system in the passive regime, while Λst is determined by the associated eigenvalue
and the probability of policy remaining passive if it is already passive. Evidently,
the persistence and volatility of the non-MSV part of the solution depend, not onREPLY TO “GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: A COMMENT” 7
a hypothesized exogenous process, but on an “exogenous” process whose properties
depends on all the parameters in the model.
To be sure, FWZ’s non-MSV solution is technically valid. But the solution is valid
only because the cross-equation restrictions between behavioral parameters and the
process governing the shocks in the non-MSV component ensure that the solution
remains bounded. An implication of these restrictions is that some parameters play
a dual role—as both “deep parameters” and as parameters governing the serial cor-
relation of non-MSV component of the solution. For example, the frequency of price
adjustment—the so-called “Calvo parameter”—and the serial correlation of the non-
MSV component, determined by Λst, cannot be chosen independently. This unusual
state of aﬀairs renders problematic any economic interpretation of the non-MSV so-
lution. We certainly do not object to cross-equation restrictions between relations
describing private sector behavior. But these are not your father’s cross-equation
restrictions—the ones that Sargent (1981) labels the “hallmark of rational expecta-
tions.” We do object to cross-equation restrictions between the parameters describ-
ing preferences and technology and those that characterize the exogenous driving
processes.
One possible way of interpreting the non-MSV solution, albeit somewhat artiﬁ-
cially, is that shifts in monetary policy may also trigger shifts in the serial correlation
structure of the shocks. We certainly advocate modeling policy regime change as
triggered by economic developments. This is the approach that Davig and Leeper
(2006a) take when they model periods when the central bank may move to a strongly
active regime as a consequence of high and rising inﬂation. However, there is no
reason to imagine that plausible methods for endogenizing regime change are con-
sistent with the cross-equation restrictions that the non-MSV solutions require. In
fact, Davig (2007) studies optimal monetary policy responses to Markov switching
in the structure of the private economy and ﬁnds that policy rules may or may notREPLY TO “GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: A COMMENT” 8
display switching, depending on exactly how the optimal policy problem is posed.
Although it is possible for optimal policy switching to be correlated with switches in
private behavior, optimal policy choices surely will not support the introduction of
the additional free parameters in the elements of Mst,st−1 in (4).
What does the non-MSV solution in (3) and (4) deliver? The inﬁnite-order moving
average of the fundamental shocks, coupled with the freedom to arbitrarily change
the volatility of the fundamental shocks through the free parameters in Mst,st−1, will
enhance any model’s ability to ﬁt the persistence and variability of observed data.
Thomas A. Lubik and Frank Schorfheide (2004), for example, ﬁnd that indeterminacy
of equilibrium allows a new Keynesian model to match U.S. data in the 1960s and
1970s, when both volatility and inﬂation persistence were quite high. While we are
all for improved ﬁt to data, in the case of non-MSV solutions, the improvement does
not spring from economic modeling; it comes entirely from arbitrary modiﬁcations to
exogenous shock processes.
Another issue bears on whether FWZ’s non-MSV solution captures important
regime-switching-induced non-linearities that an MSV solution satisfying the long-
run Taylor principle in the linear system cannot capture. It turns out that the MSV
solution does capture some key non-linearities. Regions of the parameter space that
delineate where determinate equilibria arise tend to be hyperbolic in DL, where they
would be linear in ﬁxed-regime versions of the models [ﬁgures 1-3 in DL]. DL displays
hump-shaped responses of inﬂation and output to demand shocks, whereas these re-
sponses are monotonic when regime is ﬁxed [ﬁgure 5 in DL]. Hump-shaped responses
to demand shocks are a desideratum of macro modeling. FWZ make no claim that the
non-MSV solution captures important non-linearities that the MSV solution misses.
It is also clear that the MSV solution attains outcomes that are impossible in linear
models without regime change. Consider DL’s simple Fisherian economy, with theREPLY TO “GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: A COMMENT” 9
monetary policy rule it = α(st)πt, where st is the regime at t, α(st = 1) = α1, and
α(st = 2) = α2. Posit that α1, α2, and the transition probabilities governing the
policy regime switching satisfy the long-run Taylor principle, so that the bounded
equilibrium is unique. The solution for inﬂation when the real interest rate, rt, is an




rt, i = 1,2
where α1 > 1 is the active policy regime and 0 < α2 < 1 is the passive regime. DL
show that α2 can be arbitrarily close to 0 and the variance of inﬂation in regime 2—
and unconditionally—can be arbitrarily large, yet policy satisﬁes the long-run Taylor
principle and the equilibrium is determinate. Determinacy requires that the passive
regime be suﬃciently short-lived and visited suﬃciently infrequently. A solution like
(5), in which monetary policy behavior ampliﬁes the impacts of the shock to real
interest rates, is impossible in a conventional ﬁxed-regime model with a determinate
equilibrium.
Finally, there are ways of selecting among the diﬀerent fundamental equilibria.
William A. Branch, Davig, and Bruce McGough (2008) endow agents with adaptive
expectations and use learnability as an equilibrium selection criterion. They show
that the long-run Taylor principle, which delivers a determinate bounded equilibrium
in the linear system, ensures learnability of the MSV solution when agents formulate
expectations by recursively estimating a VAR. Learnability of non-MSV solutions,
however, is more complicated and cannot arise unless agents are endowed with par-
ticular knowledge regarding the lag structure of the model.
3. Recent Progress and Directions Forward
Both DL’s paper and FWZ’s comment focus on bounded equilibria. DL derive
necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence of a unique bounded equilibriumREPLY TO “GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: A COMMENT” 10
of the expanded linear system, L. FWZ show that these conditions are necessary but
not suﬃcient for a bounded solution to the quasi-linear system, QL. Necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for a bounded solution to (QL) have not yet been derived.
Although DL argue that the boundedness deﬁnition of determinacy makes regime-
switching equilibria analogous to ﬁxed-regime equilibria, other deﬁnitions of determi-
nacy are also possible and perfectly reasonable. Following the engineering literature,
for example, Lars E. O. Svensson and Noah Williams (2007, 2008) solve for equilibria
that are bounded in expectation, or mean-square stable. Chung, Davig, and Leeper
(2007) also employ boundedness in expectation in their proof of determinacy of equi-
librium in a simple model with monetary and ﬁscal policy switching. Jess Benhabib
(2009) derives general conditions for Markov-switching rational expectations models
that imply a unique solution within various classes of solutions, such as the class of
mean-square stable solutions. Farmer, Zha, and Waggoner (2009b) derive analogous
conditions for the particular case of the new Keynesian model with a regime switching
monetary policy rule. This research derives conditions that allow a complete partition
of the parameter space into determinate and indeterminate regions, given that the
class of solutions is mean-square stable.
Under this less stringent deﬁnition of stability, the original notion of a generalized
Taylor principle survives for the quasi-linear model. This generalization implies that
an active monetary policy regime can eliminate indeterminacy in a passive monetary
regime, but the conditions depend on coeﬃcients in each monetary policy rule and the
expected duration of each regime, just as in DL’s long-run Taylor principle. Farmer,
Zha, and Waggoner (2009b) echo this when they explain that when the generalized
Taylor principle holds, “it is the set of regimes that is determinate” (italics in the
original). Their work and Benhabib’s (2009) allows a complete partitioning of the
parameter space that permits researchers to advance the applications of Markov-
switching dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models. These advances suggestREPLY TO “GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: A COMMENT” 11
that in both theoretical and empirical realms, Markov-switching rational expectations
models face a bright future.REPLY TO “GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: A COMMENT” 12
Endnotes
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Walker for helpful conversations and Jess Benhabib for useful communications on this topic.
1The “exogenous” driving process in FWZ’s solution is a moving average of past fundamental
shocks. The serial correlation properties of this term are subject to cross-equation restrictions and,
therefore, depend on the “deep parameters” describing preferences and technology.
2Davig and Leeper (2006b) provide details regarding the solution to the full non-linear New
Keynesian model with regime-switching monetary and ﬁscal policy. Other papers that solve full
non-linear dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models with regime-switching policies include
David Andolfatto and Paul Gomme (2003), Davig (2003), Hess Chung, Davig, and Leeper (2007).REPLY TO “GENERALIZING THE TAYLOR PRINCIPLE: A COMMENT” 13
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